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THE CULTURE OF A LAWYER
That characteristic feature of modern industry, "specialization", has been blamed for many things. Far be it from us to
add unduly to the formidable list of its undesirable results, but
we must say a word about the lawyer. So far the professional
man has generally been considered as quite beyond the reach
of that economic octopus, and the lawyer, weakened though he is
by mysterious attacks, has yet sighed relievedly at the curdling
tales related of the deadly creature, thankful that from this one
activity at least, he is quite safe.
No lawyer knows of a
single fellow barrister who has suffered from specialization, and
each considers himself immune.
But the lawyer has been deluded. The reason he does not
see the octopus is because he has been blinded by its very excretions. His resistance has subtly been overcome, and the lass-
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itude ascribed to unknown causes is the direct result of the creature he believes to have escaped. . . The effect is not so manifest as it is in other activities, but it is there, nevertheless.....
There was once a time when the word "lawyer" had a significance as wide as learning itself. A lawyer was a man versed in
the law, but in the other arts as well. The law, to be sure, was
his vocation, and he attempted desperately to master it; but the
entire field of culture was his avocation, and he paid careful
attention to that, too. The law in those days could truly be defined as the summation of learning; it embraced literature, in
all its forms-poetry, prose and oratory,--logic, psychology,
statesmanship, and religion--one might almost say theology.
All lawyers were learned, and many of all the learned were
lawyers.
And this condition was as it should be. Law in its proper
sense includes all of the classifications of philosophy, as related to man. It includes psychology, for mind, intention, and
motive are common terms in the lawbooks. All of the social
sciences are akin to it, because law necessarily considers man in
society; therefore society must be examined. Political science
and law are almost controvertible terms-neither government
nor law can exist alone; in a choatic government the law is disobeyed and ridiculed, and when the law is disrespected power
is abused, or authority unrecognized. Law observes religion,
because jurists admit that all law comes from God, and all theories of right are founded upon common principles of morality.
Lord Coke was not far wrong when he said "law is the perfection of reason"; a more concise dbscription of the law could
not be written.
But a lawyer is "one versed in law"; therefore he should be
master of the other arts and sciences. He should know the subjects closely interrelated with law, so that he may know his
the better ....

And up until a few years ago he did.

A study

of the history of the United States is replete with the deeds and
writings of lawyers. Among the founders of our nation James
Otis, Thomas Jefferson, Alexander Hamilton, Patrick Henry,
the Adamsts, Luther Martin, and James Madison were all lawyers; while John Marshall as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
performed as great a service in the building up of our country
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as any statesman. Abraham Lincoln was an attorney, General
Winfield Scott, the leader of the Mexican Expeditii6nary forces
in 1848, was also a lawyer; and so were Henry Clay, John Calhoun, and Daniel Webster.
Literature, too, is not complete
without the contributions of lawyers. Many men who afterwards
became famous for their prose or poetry first practiced law, and
many more studied it. And so with every activity of man; no
cultured gathering was complete without the presence of lawyers.
But lately there has been a change. Law and learning have
been divorced. A lawyer is now presumed to know nothing about
statesmanship, or literature, and the presumption is not wholly incorrect. Little by little the lawyer has receded from his position in matters of culture and public interest, and today we find
him possessing (or at least given credit for) only technical
knowledge.
The rules of law are memorized, with but little
thought given to their reason.
Blackstone is an authority
merely; the decisions of courts precedents only.
There is an excuse for this condition, true; at this day so
many cases are being decided, and so. many opinions being written, that a lawyer may have a hard time keeping up with the
most important of them. Modern business presents complex
circumstances, and the ceaseless activities of the legislators
give rise to new phases of the law.... Thus specialization has
made its entry, and to gain a complete knowledge of one thing,
all the rest is slighted. Perhaps it is impossible to revert to the
old requirements, and useless to sigh for "the old order of
things", but we hope not. The lawyer's ideal position demands
a knowledge of things cultural, and he should not be satisfied
with a relinquishment of the ideal, and a corresponding reduction in society.

